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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role of corruption in the design of monetary policies for developing
countries and obtains several interesting results. First, pegged exchange rates, currency boards, or
dollarization, while often prescribed as a solution to the problem of a lack-of-credibility for
developing countries, is typically not optimal in countries with serious corruption. Second, the
optimal degree of conservatism for a Rogoff (1985)-type central banker is an inverse function of the
corruption level. Third, either an optimally-designed inflation target or an optimal conservative
















Textbook discussions of monetary policies do not usually separate developing
from developed countries. Are there important features about developing countries
that might suggest that the optimal design of monetary policies should be diﬀerent
systematically between these groups of countries? In this paper, we study one particular
feature that is prevalent in developing (and transition) economies, namely bureaucratic
corruption. Obviously, developed countries are not immune to this problem, but it is
far less prevalent than in many developing countries. Surprisingly, the consequence of
corruption on the design of monetary policy has not been systematically examined. The
main objective of this paper is to ﬁll this void, and to demonstrate that the eﬀect is not
trivial.
As many developing countries lack credibility in their monetary policy, a subject
heavily studied in the literature,1 a conventional wisdom is that these developing
countries should peg their currency to a major currency from a low-inﬂationary country,
have a currency board, or dollarize. Our analysis in this paper will show, however, that
when corruption is considered these policies are not necessarily appropriate.
Our theory combines useful ingredients from two diﬀerent strands of the
literature. The ﬁrst strand is on the design of monetary policy, which is too voluminous
to be referenced completely here, but recent seminal contributions include Kydland and
Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978), Barro and Gordon (1983), Backus and Driﬃll (1985),
Rogoﬀ (1985), Barro (1986), Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Fischer (1995), Walsh (1995),
and Svensson (1997).2 In this paper, we make use of a framework developed by Alesina
and Tabellini (1987), where the government’s objective function includes provision of
public goods in addition to minimizing inﬂation and output ﬂuctuations.3 This strand
of literature acknowledges the importance of institutions in aﬀecting inﬂation bias.
However, a particular institutional feature that separates developing from developed
countries is the severity of bureaucratic corruption. As far as we know, the literature
on inﬂation targeting, on comparing discretionary versus rule-based monetary regimes,
and on conservative central banker, has largely ignored this institutional feature.
The second strand studies the causes and consequences of corruption, which we
use as a shorthand for weak public institutions generally. The seminal works include
Rose-Ackerman (1975) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993). Bardhan (1997) provides a
review. Empirically, Rauch and Evans (2000) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001),
1 See, for example, Cukierman (1992) and Persson and Tabellini (1990).
2 See Berger and others (2001) for a recent survey of the literature.
3 For recent work on ﬁscal and monetary policy, see Benigno and Woodford (2003) and references
cited there.-3-
among others, examined the determinants of corruption. Mauro (1995), Acemoglu,
Robinson and Johnson (2001), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), Bai and
Wei (2000), Du and Wei (2003), Fisman and Wei (2001), Wei (2000a, 2000b, 2001)
investigated the consequences of weak public institutions including corruption for
economic growth, capital controls, stock market volatility, tax evasion, and international
capital ﬂows. For the purpose of our paper, we model corruption as an erosion of a
government’s ability to collect revenue through formal tax channels. This may arise
through the outright theft by tax oﬃcials, the hiding of taxable income by taxpayers,
or practices whereby tax inspectors collude with taxpayers to reduce the latter’s tax
obligation in exchange for a bribe. As far as we know, these two strands of the literature
have not been married before. In other words, none of the papers in the literature that
we know of has examined the implications of corruption for the design of monetary
policies.
Under an inﬂation targeting framework, we study how the socially optimal level
of the inﬂation target is aﬀected by corruption. We further examine the implications of
corruption for the design of several other monetary frameworks, including a currency
board, dollarization, and a Rogoﬀ-type conservative central banker, and rank these
monetary frameworks in terms of their social welfare. We also examine the authorities’
incentive in ﬁghting corruption and improving ﬁscal capacity from a political economy
perspective.
Several interesting results emerge from our analysis. First, generally speaking,
the optimal inﬂation target is higher for a high-corruption country than for a low-
corruption country. Hence, an inﬂation target of 1-4 percent, that is common among
advanced industrialized countries and might be called “international best practice,” is
generally not something to be emulated by developing countries in our framework.
Second, pegged exchange rate, currency boards, or dollarization are often
prescribed as ways to solve the lack of credibility problem. However, we show that these
monetary regimes are typically not very credible themselves and are likely to fail (often
associated with a currency crisis) in countries where corruption is rampant.
Third, a Rogoﬀ-type conservative central banker is generally preferable to a
mechanical inﬂation target of 1-4 percent and to all exchange-rate-based monetary
arrangements. In equilibrium, the optimal degree of central bank conservatism is
inversely related to the level of corruption in the economy. In the limit, when corruption
makes collection of tax revenue infeasible, the optimal degree of conservatism is zero.
Fourth, we consider the political economy of corruption control. In particular,
we ask whether forcing a government not to rely too much on the inﬂation tax through-4-
external pressure (e.g., conditionality in an IMF program) could induce it to ﬁght
corruption. The answer is probably not. One interesting result is that severe corruption
can be a trap by itself. That is, when the initial level of corruption is suﬃciently high,
it would be diﬃcult to induce the authorities to devote eﬀort to ﬁght it.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we set up the model and discuss
the nature of the time inconsistency problem. In Section III, we analyze the nature of
the monetary commitment and compare various popular frameworks that implement
such a commitment, namely inﬂation targeting, a ﬁxed exchange rate, a currency
board, and dollarization. We ﬁnd that the introduction of corruption helps to identify
what undermines the desirability of these frameworks. In Section IV, we analyze the
discretionary monetary regime and examine how a Rogoﬀ-type conservative central
banker can improve the outcome of the discretionary regime. In this section, we also
compare the social welfare under a Rogoﬀ-type conservative central banker with the
three commitment frameworks and brieﬂy discuss the issue of implementation. In
Section V, we examine whether the authorities have incentive in ﬁghting corruption and
improving ﬁscal capacity from a political economy perspective. Section VI concludes.
II. BASIC SETUP
Our model utilizes a framework developed in Alesina and Tabellini (1987), which
we think has not been suﬃciently appreciated in the literature. The government’s
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In this objective function, the target levels for inﬂation and output are
normalized to zero. In addition, the government aims to minimize the deviation of
public goods provision from a nonnegative target g.4





π2 + α(y − y∗)2 + β(g − g)2¤
,
where α > 0a n dβ > 0 are the weights on output stability and public expenditure stability, respectively,
and y∗ > 0 is the standard (high) target level of output that is the source of the inﬂation bias in the
Barro-Gordon framework. Because the public goods provision at the g>0 level already generates an
inﬂation bias in our framework, without loss of generality we can focus our analysis on the simpler
objective function given in equation (1), where α = β =1 ,a n dy∗ = 0. We will also return to this issue
in subsection IV.B.-5-
To generate an inﬂation bias under a discretionary regime in a Barro-Gordon
(1983) model without public goods provision, one has to assume that a government’s
targeted output level is systematically above the long-run equilibrium. An interesting
property of the Alesina-Tabellini reformulation is that the need to provide public goods
(g>0) is enough to generate an inﬂation bias by itself. This is demonstrated below. For
simplicity, we normalize the target output level to zero. A more general formulation ` a
la Barro and Gordon (1983) merely complicates the algebra without yielding additional
insights.
For simplicity, we consider a deterministic economy with no shocks to aggregate
demand. A modiﬁed Lucas supply curve governs the relationship between aggregate
output and government policies: unexpected monetary growth increases aggregate
demand, and a discretionary tax rate reduces aggregate supply.5 Both monetary and
ﬁscal policy choices are taken by the government. To be more precise, output is given
by:
y = α(π − π
e − τ), α > 0, (2)
where y is the log of real output; π and πe are, respectively, the actual and expected
inﬂation rates; and τ is the tax rate on the total revenue of ﬁrms.6
Let g denote the ratio of expenditure on public goods to output. To ﬁnance
the public goods provision, the government has two sources of revenue: corporate tax
τ, and the inﬂation tax, π. A crucial assumption that we make is on the connection
between the government’s ﬁscal capacity and the level of corruption. More precisely,
corruption is assumed to cause a leakage of the tax revenue: the greater the corruption,
the greater the leakage. If the private sector pays a tax in the amount of τ, only φτ
accrues to the government, where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. φ can be thought of as a ﬁscal capacity
index. If φ = 1, then there is no leakage of tax revenue to corruption. If φ =0 ,t h e n
there is complete leakage and the government cannot collect any tax revenue.
5 Our main result carries out to more complex settings including random supply shocks, which we will
elaborate on when comparing the inﬂation targeting framework with the currency board arrangement.
This is, however, the simplest model we can think of that captures the interactions between the
monetary and ﬁscal authorities and allows us to address corruption. For further discussion of this
model and, in particular, of its micro-foundations, see Alesina and Tabellini (1987).
6 Equation (1) implicitly assumes that money demand is not aﬀected by ﬁscal policy and, therefore,
that ﬁscal policy is not subject to time inconsistencies. Otherwise, an independent central bank could
not directly control inﬂation, since it would be jointly determined by the money supply and the tax
rate.-6-
Following Alesina and Tabellini (1987), the government’s budget constraint can
be written as:7
g = φτ + π. (3)
Note that when φ = 1, there is no corruption, and our model boils down to the
set up in Alesina and Tabellini. Also, as in Alesina and Tabellini, our model abstracts
from public debt.8
III. COMMITMENT AND ITS IMPLEMENTATIONS
A. The Commitment Regime
We consider an institutional setup in which monetary and ﬁscal authorities each
control a single policy instrument (the inﬂation rate, π, by the central bank, and tax
policy, τ,b yt h eﬁscal authority), but share a common objective function deﬁned by
Equation (1). The two branches of the government solve a noncooperative game. The
equilibrium inﬂation and tax rates are given by the Nash equilibrium of the game.
In this subsection, we focus on the case in which the central bank can credibly
commit to a given inﬂation rate, i.e., π = πe. It is easy to verify that, in this case,
y = −ατ. The Nash equilibrium monetary and ﬁscal policies can be directly obtained










2(g − π). (5)
7 Equation (3) can be obtained from a two-step derivation as in Alesina and Tabellini (1987). First,
the government budget constraint in nominal terms is: Gt = φτtPtXt + Mt − Mt−1,w h e r eG denotes
public spending, P price level, X real output, and M equilibrium money supply, respectively. Second,
dividing both sides by nominal income PtXt,w eh a v egt = φτt +( Mt − Mt−1)/PtXt = φτt + πt.
8 In our view, regular tax collection is more prone to leakage due to corruption than inﬂation tax
collection, partly because the former involves many more layers of government bureaucracy. We focus
on this case in this paper and notice that it is quite straightforward to extend the analysis to allow also
for a leakage in inﬂation tax collection.
9 The second-order conditions associated with this problem (as well as those of the time-consistent
problem below) are trivially satisﬁed since V (π,τ) is globally concave with respect to its arguments.-7-
Solving these two reaction functions together, we obtain the Nash equilibrium











A number of observations can be made. First, if there is no need to provide
public goods (g = 0), then the equilibrium inﬂation (and tax) rate under a commitment
regime would be zero, consistent with the result from Barro and Gordon. Second,
the eﬀe c to fc o r r u p t i o no ni n ﬂation and taxes can be examined by taking the partial














It is straightforward to see that the equilibrium inﬂation under a commitment
regime goes up as corruption becomes more severe (or as φ goes down from one towards
zero). The intuition is as follows: a rise in corruption essentially raises the shadow cost
of raising revenue through regular tax channels vis-` a-vis inﬂation tax. Consequently, a
higher inﬂation is needed.
Third, the eﬀect of corruption on the equilibrium tax rate falls into two ranges.
For moderate corruption (or 1 ≥ φ ≥
√
2α), the optimal response to a rise in corruption
is to raise the tax rate. On the other hand, for severe corruption, (φ ≤
√
2α), the
optimal response to a rise in corruption is to reduce the tax rate. The nonmonotonicity
of the eﬀect can be understood as follows. When corruption is in the lower range, in
response to a small increase in the rate of leakage in tax revenue, the government has to
tax more to compensate for the lost revenue. On the other hand, if corruption is very
severe, a given increment in tax revenue becomes too expensive to collect in terms of
forgone output. As a result, for any increase in the rate of leakage, the optimal response
is to shift the revenue collection from regular tax to inﬂation tax.
Using equations (6) and (7), we can also obtain the equilibrium values of output







































The level of social welfare is a negative function of the inﬂation rate. Since more
corruption leads to a higher inﬂation rate, more corruption reduces social welfare.
To summarize, we have:
Proposition 1 Under the commitment regime, (1) the inﬂa t i o nr a t eg oe su pa sc o r r u p t i o n
becomes more serious; (2) the tax rate goes up (or down) with corruption if corruption
is moderate (or severe); and (3) social welfare decreases as corruption increases.
B. Inﬂation Targeting
Four popular frameworks have been developed to implement the commitment
regime. They are inﬂation targeting, a ﬁxed exchange rate, a currency board
arrangement, and dollarization. We will analyze and compare the desirability of these
frameworks based on the insights from this model.
Inﬂation targeting is a monetary arrangement in which the central bank
announces (or is asked to follow) a target level (or range) for the inﬂation rate.10 In
principle, inﬂation targeting can be viewed as an institutional commitment to achieve
the desirable outcome (πC, τC and gC)i n s t e a do f( πD, τD and gD).
There are quite a few developed countries that have adopted some version of
inﬂation targeting. They include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and Finland and Spain before the ECB became operative. In practice,
these countries target their inﬂation rates to a relatively narrow range, typically a
1-4 percent range. The fact that the inﬂation target is a range rather than a point is
explained by the existence of unanticipated shocks, such as a temporary disturbance to
10 See Bernanke and others (1999) for recent international experience of inﬂation targeting.-9-
money demand that the central bank ought to respond to. For simplicity, shocks are
assumed away in this paper. It is sometimes thought that a similar type of inﬂation
target would beneﬁt developing countries as well. For example, the IMF has advised
several transition and emerging market economies to adopt inﬂation targeting with a
similarly narrow range.
The empirical evidence, however, by and large shows that inﬂation targeting has
been less successful in developing economies than in developed countries. In fact, many
developing countries are quite reluctant to adopt this new monetary framework, even
though lack of credibility is a clear concern for them. We believe that the higher degree
of corruption in developing countries provides one important reason.11
It may be useful to make a distinction between a mechanical inﬂation target of
1-4 percent and an optimally chosen range for such a target. A mechanical inﬂation
targeting is a framework that advocates developing countries to do what developed
countries have been doing, namely to target a low inﬂation rate like 3 percent (or a
narrow range in that neighborhood). Optimal inﬂation targeting is an arrangement
that is the optimal solution under the commitment regime. More precisely, the optimal


















An immediate implication is that optimal inﬂation targeting should be a function
of the corruption level. The higher the corruption level (or the greater the slope of the
Phillip’s curve or the higher the target level of public goods provision), the higher the
optimal level of the inﬂation target should be.
For the purpose of illustration, consider a comparison between a low-corruption
country, l, (e.g., Sweden) and a high-corruption country, h, (e.g., Russia). Suppose that
11 Masson, Savastano, and Sharma (1997) and Eichengreen, Masson, Savastano, and Sharma (1999)
stated that a monetary authority “free of ﬁscal dominance” is a precondition for the success of an
inﬂation targeting regime. Our model can be viewed as a formalization of their argument. In our
view, the existence of high corruption means that the optimal range for an inﬂation target is higher.-1 0-
corruption is the only thing that is diﬀerent between these two economies φl =1a n d















In this case, the optimal inﬂation target for Russia should be six times the level
of what is optimal for Sweden. In other words, if a 3 percent inﬂation target is optimal
for Sweden, then the optimal level of the inﬂation target for Russia should be 18 percent
rather than 3 percent. This admittedly artiﬁcial example illustrates the signiﬁcance
of corruption for inﬂation targeting and shows that a high-corruption country should
target a higher inﬂation than a low-corruption country. Further, such an action raises
social welfare compared to a regime of mechanical inﬂation targeting.
C. Currency Board and Fixed Exchange Rate
A ﬁxed exchange rate regime, by deﬁnition, ﬁxes the rate of exchange between
the domestic currency and an anchor currency. A currency board arrangement is a
monetary framework whereby domestic money is rigidly pegged to a foreign currency
and domestic high-powered money is completely backed up by foreign exchange reserves
in hard currencies (or their equivalents).12 By construction, under a ﬁxed exchange
rate or currency board arrangement, there is an implied inﬂation target which is the
inﬂation rate in the anchor country’s inﬂation rate. Suppose b π denotes the inﬂation
rate in the anchor country. Generally speaking, the anchor currency is that of a
low-corruption country. We have already seen from the discussion on inﬂation targeting
that the optimal level of inﬂation for a high-corruption country is higher than that for
a low-corruption one. Therefore, there is a welfare loss associated with a ﬁxed exchange
rate or currency board arrangement for a high-corruption country. To put it diﬀerently,
our discussion suggests that for a high-corruption country, there is tension under a
ﬁxed rate or currency board arrangement between the implied inﬂation target (i.e., a
relatively low level) and the inﬂation rate that the country ﬁnds optimal to pursue (i.e.,
a relatively high level). The tension can be relieved if the country can eﬀectively reduce
corruption or adopt other compensating policies or institutions.
To see this in more precise terms, we can work out the welfare loss for a
high-corruption country under a ﬁxed rate or currency board arrangement. Given the
monetary arrangement, the authority is left with only one independent instrument, tax
12 See Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2000, 2003) for insightful discussions on currency board and its
problems.-1 1-
rate τ.T h u st h eﬁscal policy can be directly obtained from the ﬁrst-order condition of





2(g − b π),
Assuming that the anchor country can eﬀectively implement an inﬂation target



























































Once again, the more serious the corruption in the country that adopts a
currency board arrangement (a lower φ), the higher the diﬀerence between the levels of
inﬂation under a currency board arrangement and under a commitment regime.

















































Under the assumption that b φj > φ,a n dt h u sπCB < πC and τCB > τC.I n
other words, relative to an optimal commitment regime, a currency board arrangement
implies too low an inﬂation rate but too high a tax rate.
So far, we have not used the word “credibility” in our discussion. Of course,
introducing credibility is considered one major motive for countries to adopt a ﬁxed
rate regime or a currency board. Our discussion in this subsection suggests corruption
as a possible source of lack of credibility. A ﬁx e dr a t er e g i m eo rac u r r e n c yb o a r di s
more diﬃcult to sustain in a high-corruption country because the inﬂation rate implied
by the exchange rate regime is too low from the viewpoint of the country.
In the previous discussion, we assumed away stochastic shocks to the aggregate
Phillips curve. With these shocks, a ﬁxed exchange rate, a currency board arrangement,
and mechanical inﬂation targeting (that targets to the level of inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
anchor country) are equivalent. However, we note parenthetically that if shocks are
introduced, an inﬂation targeting framework can dominate a ﬁxed-rate or currency
board arrangement as it allows for the ﬂexibility to respond to shocks that are speciﬁc
to the domestic economy.
D. Dollarization
Dollarization, or more generally, the adoption of a foreign currency, is a monetary
arrangement that involves an even stronger commitment to low inﬂation —assuming
the anchor country has low inﬂation— than a currency board arrangement. Unlike
a currency board arrangement, the national currency disappears completely under
dollarization.13 The commitment is stronger because the cost to the government of
reversing such an arrangement is higher. If the anchor country is the same for a
currency board and for dollarization (e.g., the United States), the inﬂation rates of the
two regimes are obviously the same. However, the government in a dollarization regime
has to forgo seigniorage revenue associated with the issue of domestic money. Hence,
13 See Fischer (1982), among others, for an analysis of seigniorage as a rationale for a national money.-1 3-
the social welfare is lower under a dollarization regime than under a currency board
arrangement.
To demonstrate the social loss more precisely, we start by noting that the loss of
the inﬂation tax implies the following (3)
g = φτ. (15)
As in the currency board arrangement, under dollarization the authority is left
with only one independent instrument, tax rate τ. Using (15) in (3) and then taking






Denoting πDO as the inﬂation rate of country j under rational expectations,
where j can be the United States or another country whose currency replaces the






















Once again, we should expect that πDO < πC.T h a ti s ,t h ei n ﬂation level under




Similar to a currency board arrangement, the more serious is domestic corruption
(a lower φ), the higher is the diﬀerence between the level of inﬂation under dollarization










































































α2 + b φ
2´2 > 1
if φ ≥ α, which is a weaker condition than φ ≥
√
2α, and thus will likely hold unless
corruption is very serious. If φ < α,t h e nV DO <VCB < 0.
At this point, we can rank the various monetary frameworks.
Proposition 2 Generally speaking, the optimal commitment regime dominates a me-
chanical inﬂation targeting regime, which (weakly) dominates a ﬁxed rate or currency
board arrangement, which in turn dominates a dollarization regime.
IV. DISCRETION AND CONSERVATIVE CENTRAL BANKER
A. A Conventional Discretionary Regime
If the central bank cannot precommit, the inﬂation rate (and correspondingly
the tax rate) derived for a commitment regime would not be time consistent. As is
well known in the literature, if the expected inﬂation were at the commitment level
(πe = πC), the central bank would always ﬁnd it optimal to raise inﬂation unexpectedly.
Hence, such inﬂation expectations would not be rational. The time-consistent policy
mix, (πD,τD), is the Nash equilibrium solution to the noncoordinated game played by
the central bank and ﬁscal authority, who take the expected inﬂation rate as given.-1 5-
The solution is characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions associated with (1),
where, in addition, we require that the expected inﬂation rate equals its equilibrium













2(g − π). (20)









(2 + φ)α2 + φ
2. (22)
We can examine how monetary and ﬁscal policies would optimally respond to
a rise in the corruption level and compare it with the case when the central bank is
able to commit. In contrast to the commitment regime, the optimal response of both
monetary and ﬁscal policies to a rise in corruption depends on how severe corruption is.
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[(2 + φ)α2 + φ
2]2.
If corruption is relatively modest (e.g., φ ≥
√
α2 +1− 1), then the optimal
response to a rise in corruption is to raise the inﬂation rate (∂πD/∂φ < 0). On the
other hand, if the corruption level is already serious (φ ≤
√
α2 +1− 1), then the
opposite response (lowering the inﬂation tax) to a rise in corruption would be optimal.
The optimal response of the ﬁscal policy, τD, also has a similar nonmonotonicity. For
moderate corruption (
√
2α < φ), an optimal response to a rise in corruption is to raise
the tax rate. But at a more serious level of corruption (
√
2α ≥ φ), the optimal response
would be to lower the tax rate.
This makes an interesting comparison with the commitment case. For example,
starting at a high level of corruption (e.g., φ ≤
√
α2 +1− 1), the optimal monetary
policy response to a rise in corruption is to lower the inﬂation rate under a discretionary-1 6-
regime, but to raise the inﬂation rate under a commitment regime. A natural question
to ask is whether the ”excessive” level of inﬂation under a discretionary regime relative
to a commitment regime could disappear at a very high level of corruption. A related
question is whether the welfare ordering of a commitment versus a discretionary regime
could be switched at a high level of corruption.
To see the answer to the ﬁrst question, we can work out the diﬀerence between























[(2 + φ)α2 + φ
2]
.
It can be seen that, as long as φ > 0, the inﬂation level under discretion is always
higher than under commitment (whereas the tax rate under discretion is always lower
than under commitment). In the extreme case in which corruption makes tax collection
infeasible (φ =0 ) ,t h ed i ﬀerences in the monetary and ﬁscal policies under the two
regimes (πD− πC and τD − τC, respectively) tend to disappear.
To answer the second question, it would be useful to ﬁrst work out the amount of
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(2 + φ)α2 + φ
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(2 + φ)α2 + φ
2¤2 . (25)-1 7-
Comparing V D with V C,w eh a v e
V D
V C ≥ 1,
where the equality sign holds when φ =0 .
To summarize, we have:
Proposition 3 The optimal commitment regime generates a higher social welfare than
the discretionary regime.
Only in the extreme case when corruption completely destroys the tax collection
system (φ =0 )w o u l dt h ed i ﬀerence between the two regimes disappear.
B. A Rogoﬀ-type Conservative Central Banker
The discussion in Section IV.A suggests that the optimal commitment regime
strictly dominates the discretionary regime for every level of corruption except for
the extreme case in which corruption renders the regular tax collection completely
infeasible. This is a relatively modest generalization of the result in Kydland and
Prescott (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
If, for whatever reason, a commitment regime of any sort is not available, then,
as proved by Rogoﬀ (1985), delegating the monetary policy to a more conservative
central banker (still with discretion) can improve upon the social welfare relative
to a straightforward discretionary regime discussed in Section IV.A. Here, “more
conservative” means the weight in the loss function on inﬂation placed by the central
banker is higher than by the social planner.
In this section, we examine whether and how the optimal degree of central
banker conservatism is aﬀected by the presence of corruption. As a by-product, we also
examine how the inclusion of public goods provision in the social welfare function may
modify our understanding of the role of a conservative central banker.
Consider a modiﬁed central banker’s problem. Let S denote the weight on the
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. (26)
If the central banker cares about inﬂation as much as the social planner, then
S = 1. If the central banker is more conservative than the social planner, then S ≥ 1.
The central banker and the ﬁscal authority still play a noncooperative Nash
game. The time-consistent policy mix in this case, labeled as (πCC,τCC), is characterized
by the ﬁrst-order conditions associated with (26), where, in addition, we require that
the expected inﬂation rate equals its equilibrium value. Thus, (πCC,τCC)s o l v e st h e
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2. (30)
Obviously, at S = 1, the regime of a conservative central banker collapses to the





In fact, ∂πCC/∂S<0a n d∂τCC/∂S>0. Therefore, the more conservative is the
central banker, the lower the equilibrium inﬂation rate is, but the higher the tax rate
becomes.
The eﬀect of a rise in corruption on the inﬂation rate (or tax rate) is
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2]2 .
As in a conventional discretionary regime, ∂πCC/∂φ > 0i fa n do n l yi f
φ ≤
√
α2 +1− 1. That is, when corruption is very serious, the optimal response to a
rise in corruption is to lower inﬂation. On the other hand, if φ >
√
α2 +1− 1, i.e.,
when corruption is relatively modest, then ∂πCC/∂φ < 0, which means that an optimal
response to a rise in corruption is to raise inﬂation.
There is a similar asymmetry for the response of ﬁscal policy. When corruption is




S, the optimal response to a rise in corruption
is to lower the tax, ∂τCC/∂φ ≥ 0. On the other hand, when corruption is relatively




S, then the opposite adjustment in the ﬁscal policy is
appropriate, since ∂τCC/∂φ < 0.
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Suppose the social planner can choose any value of S, then what is the optimal
degree of conservatism of the central banker that would maximize the social welfare?-2 0-
To answer this, we maximize the social welfare function described by (33) with respect
to S. The ﬁrst-order condition leads to14
Proposition 4 S∗ =1+φ.
Let us measure the degree of conservatism of the central banker by the excess
weight she places on the inﬂation term relative to the social planner, i.e., conservatism
= S − 1. The above equation suggests that the optimal degree of conservatism is
given by S∗ − 1=φ. A number of observations can be made. First, for 0 < φ ≤ 1, a
central banker that is more conservative than the social planner should be appointed
to improve upon the social welfare under a discretionary regime. Second, the optimal
degree of conservatism depends on the degree of corruption in the economy. The greater
the level of corruption (i.e., a lower value of φ), the less conservative the central banker
should be. Third, in the extreme case in which corruption prevents the working of the
tax system completely (i.e., when φ = 0), the optimal degree of conservatism is zero.
That is, the social planner would choose a central banker who has the same preference
as herself.
When the central banker is optimally chosen (i.e., S∗ =1+φ), we can compute





















Proposition 5 When the conservatism of the central banker is optimally determined,
this (modiﬁed) discretionary regime restores the ﬁrst-best solution under commitment.
This proposition is somewhat surprising and worth some further elaboration.
There are a number of diﬀerences between our framework and that of the original Rogoﬀ
framework. First, in Rogoﬀ (1985), the social planner is only concerned with inﬂation
and output stabilization. In contrast, we have added public goods provision as part of
the objective function. Although a more conservative central banker can lower inﬂation
further, it would not be optimal to do that given the increasing costs of collecting taxes.
Second, we do not have stochastic shocks to the aggregate supply/demand. Third, we
14 It is easy to verify that (33) is indeed convex in S.-2 1-
do not have the equivalent of the labor market distortion that causes the social planner
to attempt to stabilize output at a level above its natural rate.
It is clear that the welfare under a Rogoﬀ-style conservative central banker
dominates that in a currency board arrangement or dollarization. One may think
that installing a conservative central banker requires fewer technical preconditions
than implementing an inﬂation targeting framework due to the principle of contract
implementation (Maskin and Moore (1999), Moore and Repullo (1988 and 1990)).15
If that is true, the conservative central banker may also be better than an inﬂation
targeting framework, though it is beyond the scope of this paper to have a full discussion
on this issue.
In the absence of public goods provision (and hence ﬁscal policy), the Walsh
(1995) contract implements the commitment solution under a discretionary regime.
However, once ﬁscal policy is introduced, strategic manipulation by the ﬁscal authority
could make the Walsh contract suboptimal (Huang and Padilla (2002)).16 As a result,
the discretionary tax can be too high while the inﬂation rate may be too low. By this
logic, the Rogoﬀ-type conservative central banker arrangement may outperform the
Walsh-type incentive contract.
V. FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND IMPROVING FISCAL CAPACITY
So far we have treated ﬁscal capacity, φ, as exogenously given. Eﬀorts in ﬁghting
corruption and improving ﬁscal capacity should increase the value of φ. In this section
we endogenize corruption and ask when a government would be willing to undertake
anti-corruption reforms.
To start with, we observe that a government’s eﬀort to ﬁght corruption and
improve ﬁscal capacity is likely to come with a cost. The cost could be in the form
of a loss of economic rents that oﬃcials enjoy, or a stiﬀened resistance from powerful
special interest groups that have been beneﬁting from corruption and lost tax revenue.
To capture this observation, we assume that
φ = φ0 + f,
where f ∈ [0,(1 − φ0)] denotes the level of eﬀort by authorities, φ0 is the initial value
of φ before any eﬀorts have been devoted. We assume further that the authorities
15 See Moore (1992) for an excellent survey of this literature.
16 Their paper, nevertheless, does not study the eﬀects of corruption.-2 2-
otherwise share the preference of the social planner except that they also have to bear
the cost of ﬁghting corruption, which is proportional to their eﬀort,
C = θf,
where θ > 0 is the unit cost coeﬃcient.
With this simple setup, the equilibrium eﬀort level, and thus the equilibrium
value of φ c a nb es o l v e di nt w os t e p si nap r i n c i p a l - a g e n tf r a m e w o r k . B e c a u s ea n
optimally chosen (Rogoﬀ-type) central banker can implement the commitment regime
under discretion, there is no loss of generality by focusing on the commitment case
alone. The policy game is the same as before, except that the authorities, foreseeing a
commitment monetary regime, need to choose their level of anti-corruption eﬀort ﬁrst.









Since the authorities share the preference of the social planner, their loss
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2 − θf. (34)
Taking ﬁrst derivative of (34) with respect to f,o n eg e t s
α2g2 (φ0 + f)
£
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an interior optimal solution 0 <f ∗ < 1 − φ0 exists.

















2α ≤ φ0 + f∗;
> 0, if
√
2α > φ0 + f∗.
Further examining the ﬁrst-order condition (35), we have the following corollary,
which suggests that the cost coeﬃcient, θ, is a key parameter that aﬀects the authorities’
incentive to ﬁght corruption and improve ﬁscal capacity.
Corollary 1 If θ ≥ θ,then the authorities would have no incentive to devote any eﬀorts
to ﬁght corruption; If θ < θ, however, the authorities would have incentive to devote full





In other words, when the initial level of corruption is very serious, such that φ0 has
a very low value, most values of θ ≥ θ. In this case, the authorities would have no
i n c e n t i v et od e v o t ea n ye ﬀorts to ﬁght corruption. In this case, setting a low inﬂation
level through inﬂation targeting or appointing a Rogoﬀ-type conservative central
banker would not by themselves induce the government to devote more eﬀort to ﬁght
corruption. Perhaps reforms to reduce corruption and to improve ﬁscal capacity should
be taken before adopting a monetary regime aiming at a low level of inﬂation.
If the initial corruption is not too serious but moderate, such that θ < θ holds,
then the authorities would have incentive on their own to devote eﬀorts to reduce
the corruption. Setting a low inﬂation level through inﬂation targeting (to induce
corruption ﬁghting) would not hurt, though it is probably not a corruption-ﬁghting tool
by itself.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have examined the eﬀects of corruption and ﬁscal policy
on inﬂation and reexamined the desirability of several popular monetary regimes,-2 4-
including inﬂation targeting, a ﬁxed exchange rate, a currency board arrangement, and
a Rogoﬀ-type conservative central banker.
The simple model of a monetary policy game, whereby corruption adversely
aﬀects the taxable revenue that the government can collect, has generated a number of
interesting results for the literature on optimal monetary policy and for the literature
on corruption. First, pegged exchange rate regime, currency board, or dollarization
are often prescribed as means to increase the credibility of a government’s resolve to
maintain low inﬂation. Our analysis suggests that these monetary regimes may not
be very credible themselves and can fail in countries where underlying corruption is
serious. Second, an optimally chosen conservative central banker is generally preferable
to a mechanical inﬂation target of 1-4 percent and to all exchange-rate-based monetary
arrangements. The optimal degree of conservatism is inversely related to the level of
corruption in the economy. Third, the notion that a low inﬂation target or a currency
board can be used as an instrument to induce governments to ﬁght corruption is
questionable. These ﬁndings are important in the design of monetary policies for
developing countries.
A number of further extensions can be made to the work done in this paper.
For example, the government can be allowed to borrow in domestic bond market or
international capital market. The interactions among corruption, debt, and monetary
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